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ABSTRACT:  
 
Prior research (e.g., Dechow, Huson, and Sloan 1994) documents that, on average, compensation 
practices appear to shield CEO pay from income-decreasing special items.  In some 
circumstances, compensation shielding can be efficient.  For example, it may encourage CEOs 
with earnings-sensitive pay to take an action that reduces current earnings but nevertheless 
enhances value.  Compensation shielding can be inefficient in other circumstances, such as when a 
board of directors is captured by an overly-powerful CEO or the magnitude of negative special 
items has been overstated (e.g., by shifting core expenses into special items.)  This paper explores 
whether strong governance can explain cross-sectional variation compensation shielding, and 
whether stronger governance and auditing are associated with less shifting of expenses.  We find 
that strong corporate governance mechanisms, as captured by board (and committee) 
independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Act (SOX) and its related governance reforms, and 
switches to Big-4 auditors, are all associated with less compensation shielding.  While our 
evidence suggests that strong overall governance is associated with a reduction in manipulation of 
core earnings through classification shifting in the cross-section, we find inconclusive evidence to 
suggest that board independence or SOX influence classification shifting. 
Keywords: CEO Compensation, Compensation Shielding, Special Items, Classification Shifting, 
Corporate Governance, Board Independence  
JEL Classifications: M41, G38, J33 
Data Availability: All data used in the study are available from public sources.  
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1.    Introduction 
Prior research finds that CEO compensation is shielded from negative (income-
decreasing) special charges (Dechow, Huson, and Sloan 1994; Gaver and Gaver 1998; Adut, 
Cready, and Lopez 2003).  That is, the level of annual compensation paid to the average CEO 
places a higher weight on earnings before negative special items than it does on negative special 
items. Defined by Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 30, special items are unusual 
or infrequent expenses that are involved in transactions or activities, such as restructuring, gains 
on sale of assets, or litigation costs. An agency-theoretic view can characterize compensation 
shielding as efficient.  For example, compensation shielding can encourage risk-averse CEOs to 
take long-term value-enhancing actions (e.g., restructuring) that decrease short-term profits (e.g., 
Dechow et al. 1994). Alternatively, self-interest could lead CEOs to take advantage of weak pay-
sensitivity to these infrequent charges by shifting some normal expenses into the special items 
category.  This subtle form of earnings management, known as classification shifting (e.g., McVay 
2006), leaves bottom-line net income unchanged. We are interested in the interplay between 
classification shifting, pay shielding, and corporate governance.   
 This paper asks two questions.  First, does stronger governance measured at board and 
board committee level, and by external audit quality, imply reduced earnings management in the 
form of shifting core expenses into negative special items? Second, when classification shifting is 
likely to have occurred, does stronger governance imply less shielding of pay from negative 
special items? We draw data from 1995-2012, a time period characterized both by tightening of 
rules on the composition of boards of directors (e.g., the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) 
Act (SOX) ) and increased public scrutiny of executive pay practices. In a similar manner to 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), we exploit the requirements for strengthened board 
independence imposed around SOX to capture relatively exogenous changes in board 
independence. This allows us to use difference-in-differences tests to incorporate good controls for 
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endogeneity and omitted variables. However, this research design choice leads us to employ a 
relatively small sample; therefore, for a larger sample, this paper’s questions are also analyzed in 
cross-section using firm-year measures of overall governance strength and audit quality. 
Since classification shifting is used to manipulate core earnings, we start by estimating 
excessive core earnings using models of “normal” core earnings from McVay (2006), and Fan, 
Barua, Cready, and Thomas (2010).  We test whether stronger governance reduces classification 
shifting by regressing estimated abnormal core earnings from these models on the absolute 
magnitude of negative special items.  As in McVay (2006), a positive coefficient indicates 
classification shifting on average; we test if the coefficient is less positive when oversight is 
stronger. 
 The evidence is mixed.  The difference-in-differences analysis yields almost no support 
for the hypothesis that classification shifting of core expenses is sensitive to board independence 
or SOX.  However, using cross-sectional tests, classification shifting varies inversely with a broad 
index of governance strength that captures characteristics beyond board independence.  Also, audit 
quality as captured by switching to or from a Big 4 auditor relates to classification shifting as 
predicted. These particular cross-sectional results are consistent with our hypothesis.    
Our hypothesis that stronger governance is associated with less shielding of misclassified 
negative special items finds more consistent support.  The difference-in-differences results suggest 
that, post-2002, there is generally less shielding of incentive compensation from negative special 
items.  Also, mandated increases in board independence are incrementally associated with less 
compensation shielding.  Cross-sectional analyses that employ the broad governance index 
confirm that stronger oversight ties to a larger compensation weight on our measure of 
misclassified negative special items (i.e., less pay-shielding).  
 Summing up, the tests suggest that stronger governance is linked to higher sensitivity of 
CEO pay to misclassified negative special items.   However, classification shifting per se does not 
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consistently decrease in all measures of stronger governance, across our two research designs.  To 
some readers the classification shifting results may seem to contradict the pay-sensitivity findings.  
We cite theoretical work suggesting that both outcomes are feasible if pay-performance sensitivity 
and earnings management are jointly determined  
This paper adds to the literature on the interplay between CEO compensation and 
earnings management.  We rely on theoretical work by Goldman and Slezak (2006), Laux and 
Laux (2009), and Dutta and Fan (2014) to provide intuition for this interplay.  These agency 
models recognize two key tasks of boards: setting pay policies and monitoring accounting choices.  
An important base assumption in these models is that information asymmetry prevents the 
principal from detecting earnings management with certainty.1  The first two works yield the 
direct prediction that pay-performance sensitivity is weaker when accounting oversight is less 
effective (i.e., more pay shielding), our second hypothesis.  However, the predicted impact of 
stronger governance on earnings management is ambiguous. Under these models, an increase in 
the detection probability of, and penalties for, earnings management have direct negative effects 
on earnings management incentives (our first hypothesis). Yet the higher pay sensitivity on 
earnings invites further earnings management.  Hence a regulatory change that is intended to curb 
earnings management can lead to an increased, reduced, or unchanged level.2   
The cited models capture an abstract version of earnings management while we 
investigate the effect of governance on a specific form of earnings management, namely, “core” 
earnings management via classification shifting. We contend that the results of our data-based 
research can shed light on the net importance of underlying direct and indirect effects of three 
factors of interest–governance mechanisms, the structure of CEO pay, and classification shifting.   
                                                 
1 In these models, if earnings management can be detected with certainty, it is undone by 
compensation committees and is irrelevant. 
2 We use directional hypotheses to streamline the presentation, but there is sufficient hypothesis 
tension to justify two-sided hypotheses. All statistical tests are two tailed. 
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 Prior empirical research focuses on two of these three factors at a time. Papers such as 
Cheng and Warfield (2005), Bergstresser and Phillipon (2006), and Burns and Kedia (2006) show 
that CEO pay structures create incentives that lead to earnings management.3  These papers 
capture CEO pay structure based on equity incentives, and use discretionary accruals, accounting 
restatements or fraud to capture accounting manipulation. A second literature includes Carter, 
Lynch, and Zechman (2009) and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009). These papers show that 
exogenous governance changes imposed in 2002 have influenced CEO pay packages and pay-
performance sensitivity. A third stream examines whether earnings management is less prevalent 
in the presence of stronger governance mechanisms (Klein 2002; Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006). Our paper links governance and pay to a different form of earnings management, namely 
classification shifting.  Although there is existing research on classification shifting (McVay 2006; 
Fan et al. 2010), and compensation shielding (Dechow et al. 1994; Gaver and Gaver 1998; Adut et 
al. 2003), these are separate streams that do not link governance structures to these practices.4   
 Further, evidence on our research questions helps to complete the picture provided by 
existing work concerning the effects of SOX regulation and governance on performance measures 
and CEO pay.  Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find that CEO compensation decreased 
following the 2002 reforms. Their Table 2 (Columns 3 and 4) shows that total compensation was 
more sensitive to ROA following SOX for all firms.  Our results suggest that this finding, in part, 
reflects increased pay sensitivity to negative special items in the post-SOX period (i.e., there is 
less shielding), and that this pay practice co-varies with committee independence.  With regard to 
                                                 
3 Early research includes Healy (1985), Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995), and Holthausen, Larker, 
and Sloan (1995), among others. 
4 Haw, Ho, and Li (2011) touch on the link between governance and classification shifting. They 
find classification shifting in East Asian countries increases in the presence of weaker legal 
institutions and opaque disclosure, and for firms with controlling shareholders.  In comparison, we 
use the North American regime with strong legal systems and relatively transparent accounting. 
Our governance variables are firm and time specific. 
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earnings management, Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008), and Cheng, Chen and Wang (2015) find a 
decrease in discretionary accruals following SOX, while Cohen et al. (2008) document an increase 
in the use of real earnings management tools.5  In our case, classification shifting does not reliably 
decrease post-SOX, though some tests suggest its use weakens as governance improves. 
We provide additional context on measuring classification shifting in Section 2. This 
leads to a discussion of other components of negative special items.  We also develop our 
hypotheses in this part of the paper.  Section 3 contains key research design choices while Section 
4 reports our main results. Section 5 contains supplementary analysis and Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Negative Special Item Components, Pay Shielding and Hypothesis Development 
Overview on Measuring Classification Shifting and Pay Shielding  
Classification shifting refers to the improper loading of core expenses into negative 
special items.  This creates excessive core earnings without changing total earnings; that is, 
increases in core earnings are offset by an equal increase in negative special items.  Compensation 
shielding refers to the empirical regularity that there is weaker pay sensitivity to negative special 
items than there is to core earnings, defined (roughly) as earnings before negative special items 
(e.g., Adut et al. 2003). We link compensation shielding to classification shifting, and we therefore 
require a measure of classification shifting.  
Agency theoretic models that allow for earnings management assume that manipulation 
cannot be detected with certainty by the principal.  Given this, researchers should not expect to 
measure manipulation perfectly.  Our proxy for “excessive core earnings” contains measurement 
error, which is transferred to our proxy for classification-shifted expenses. If this error is 
correlated with model variables, it affects our ability to draw valid inferences.  While we rely on 
                                                 
5 Other studies exploit the 2002 regulatory changes to explore the effects of governance on 
financial reporting and performance. For example, Donelson, McInnis, and Mergenthaler (2015) 
report a reduction in accounting fraud following SOX, and Armstrong, Core, and Guay (2014) 
report a reduction in information asymmetry. 
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models of classification shifting from the prior literature, we cannot eliminate measurement error. 
Following McVay (2006), “excessive core earnings” is measured as the residual term 
from an industry-year regression of a proxy for core earnings (operating income before 
depreciation expense and before special items, CE) on economic determinants.  If this measure is 
positive in the same period that negative special items are recorded, we label the excessive core 
earnings as “classification shifted” expenses (CS). We subtract CS from the total of negative 
special items (NSI) to identify the portion of negative special items that are “not classification-
shifted” (NSINSC). We estimate the sensitivity of CEO pay to classification-shifted expenses, CS. 
The pay weight on CS tells us whether CEO pay is shielded from the portion of negative special 
items that is most subject to classification shifting. We discuss below the accounting practices for 
all components of negative special items to provide insight on CS and NSINCS.  
 Components of Negative Special Items and Classification Shifting 
Negative special items arise when firms’ economic circumstances create the need for 
write-offs or reserves.  These infrequent or unusual expenses are reported “above the line” 
contributing to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) measure of continuing 
operations.  Yet analysts tend to define core earnings as income before these special charges, and 
at some firms, compensation policies explicitly use pro-forma earnings (before these items) to 
measure performance (Appendix 1).  Examples of negative special items are restructuring charges, 
merger-related costs, asset write-downs, litigation reserves, and losses on sales of assets.   
  Among the types of negative special items, charges related to restructurings or mergers 
are most prone to classification shifting (McVay 2006, Page 506).  Managers can misclassify 
normal severance charges, and day-to-day legal fees and other administrative expenses, as charges 
and fees related to the restructuring or merger. 
Prior to 2002, Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issue No. 94-3 provided the relevant 
accounting rules for restructuring charges. EITF 94-3 states that restructuring charges can be 
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recognized when a company commits to a restructuring plan and if the costs recognized have no 
further future benefits.6 McVay (2006), and Bens and Johnston (2009) confirm that discretion 
under EITF Issue No. 94-3 provided opportunities for the manipulation of these charges. 
The discretion under EITF Issue No. 94-3 to shift expenses forward in time was reduced 
in 2002 by the passing of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 146.  This standard specifies that 
restructuring-related expenses be recognized when costs are incurred.  Lee (2014) provides 
confirmatory evidence that FAS 146 has been effective.  While FAS 146 surely limits expense 
shifting across time, the increased scrutiny of expense recognition might also impact vertical 
expense shifting (i.e., classification shifting). Therefore, FAS 146 provides a reason, beyond SOX, 
to view 2002 as an intervention year for classification shifting. 
Based on accounting practices for items that are eligible for the special items category, 
the “non-classification shifted” component of negative special items (NSINCS) consists of three 
parts: i) expenses that properly belong in special items due to an event such as a restructuring or a 
merger; ii) other special items that are not amenable to vertical shifting, such as losses on sales of 
assets and write-downs; and iii) the negative of any measurement error in CS. There is an 
extensive literature on write-downs, including Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996), Riedl (2004), 
and Beatty and Weber (2006).  These papers suggest the timing and magnitude of write-downs are 
discretionary.  Since NSINSC contains both the negative of measurement error in CS, and, other 
discretionary charges such as write-downs, we do not make a prediction for its pay weight.   
Development of hypotheses 
We test two main hypotheses on the effects of stronger governance on compensation 
shielding and classification shifting.  Bear in mind we measure stronger governance based on 
                                                 
6 EITF Issue No. 94-3 gave latitude for firms to shift both current and future expenses to negative 
special items, creating a big bath.  However, this standard requires footnote disclosures that 
discipline big baths.  Specifically firms were required to list the types of restructuring costs by use, 
and to provide ongoing reconciliations of the cash flows associated with the recognized obligation.  
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whether the compensation and audit committees or the board as a whole meet post-SOX 
independence standards, and based on whether a firm-year falls into the post 2002 period. We also 
use Big 4 audit indicators and a firm-year index of overall governance strength. 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Firm-years with weaker governance practices exhibit greater 
classification-shifting of expenses from core earnings to negative special items. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Compensation practices at firm-years with weaker governance practices 
are more likely to shield pay for classification-shifted expenses. 
These hypotheses follow from the simple reasoning that a CEO can benefit from 
classification-shifted expenses because this overstates the board’s perception of core earnings, and 
core earnings has relatively high pay-performance sensitivity (e.g., Appendix 1).7 Since 
classification shifting is counter to sound accounting practice, and our measures of better 
governance (e.g., board and committee independence) intend to capture the effort and precision of 
the audit function, we expect that better governance will be associated with reduced classification 
shifting.8  Similarly, since stronger governance should avoid inefficient pay practices, we 
conjecture boards will place a greater discount on core earnings when recurring expenses are 
likely to have been shifted into special items.  These two hypotheses depend on there being cross-
sectional variation in firms’ costs or abilities to detect and prevent earnings management, and in 
firms’ willingness to scrutinize performance measures that are used in pay practices.  We are 
proposing that our various governance constructs capture this cross-sectional variation.  
  However, agency theoretic models of the three factors we examine—governance, 
earnings management and CEO pay—suggest our directional hypotheses do not take into account 
simultaneity between incentive pay and earnings manipulation.   Such models (e.g., Goldman and 
                                                 
7 We assume that the board does not measure core earnings without noise.   
8 This is the reasoning used in Klein (2002) for her expectation that more independent audit 
committees would be associated with lower discretionary accruals (page 378, last sentence). 
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Slezak 2006; Laux and Laux 2009) designate a risk averse CEO as the agent and a risk neutral 
shareholder or the board of directors as the principal.  CEO actions are not observable, but both 
principal and agent hold common beliefs about the effects of actions on the distribution of 
outcomes, and each party knows the other’s utility function.  Specifically, the CEO can undertake 
productive actions to maximize firm value and non-productive actions that add bias to earnings.  
Conflicts in the objectives of the CEO and the principal arise from their respective difference in 
utility for these productive and non-productive actions. The principal anticipates that earnings are 
managed and adjusts pay and pay-performance sensitivity with this moral hazard in mind (Laux 
and Laux page 877, Goldman and Slezak page 605).9 The expectation of earnings management 
dampens pay-performance sensitivity to overall earnings. 
   The better the audit technology, meaning the better the detection of and the greater are 
penalties for earnings management, the less incentive the manager has to manipulate the 
performance measure (H1) and the larger is pay sensitivity to earnings components (H2). Better 
audit technologies make overall perceived core earnings more revealing of productive effort.  
However, the increase in pay-performance sensitivity further tempts the manager to manipulate 
earnings.  Because of this spillover, the net impact on earnings management is ambiguous.10   
Both Goldman and Slezak (2006), and Laux and Laux (2009) maintain an assumption 
that CEOs can profit from earnings management (e.g., through liquidating stock grants) before the 
board is able to observe the true economic state of the firm.  The equilibrium outcomes change if 
this assumption is not true, and this introduces tension into our second hypothesis (H2).  For 
                                                 
9 This does not mean that the earnings management is “detected.”  It simply means that all parties 
understand that earning management is occurring if this is a rational choice for the CEO. 
10 “Earnings management” in the theoretical papers is abstract (see also footnote 11.)  In our 
specific context (classification shifting), we envision stronger boards increase the pay weight on 
perceived core earnings and perceived core earnings should include the board’s estimate of 
recurring expenses that appear in special items. This leads to an uncertain net effect on 
classification shifting because an increase in core earnings sensitivity tempts more forms of 
classification shifting (which we capture empirically through the total CS).   
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example, Dutta and Fan (2014) assume that earnings management is achieved through reversing 
accruals. A period t manipulation creates a short-term bias in investor’s perceptions of firm value. 
This bias reverses in t+1 when the accrual reverses. Dutta and Fan also assume firms can pre-
commit to future pay contracts when the CEO is hired. Given the assumptions in Dutta and Fan, 
average pay-performance sensitivity can be higher (lower) in the face of better auditing 
technology if the manager’s productivity increases (decreases) over time.  
The abovementioned equilibrium models show how feedback to and from pay-
performance sensitivity leads to ambiguity in the relation between governance and earnings 
management. Yet, these models are an over-simplification.  They do not address the specific form 
of earnings management we investigate or the governance measures that we capture.11 In addition, 
the directional impact of stronger governance on classification shifting and pay-performance 
sensitivity will be influenced by factors that lie outside the models, including the costs of other 
earnings management tools or the firm-specific contract terms.12  Relatively minor changes in the 
theoretical assumptions can lead to alternative predicted effects of governance on pay-
performance sensitivity or classification shifting. Therefore, we test our naïve directional 
hypotheses using two-tailed tests.   
3.  Research design 
                                                 
11 For example, earnings management in Goldman and Slezak (2006) occurs when an auditor is 
convinced by management to issue a biased report of share value in period 2, and “governance” is 
captured by fines and penalties that attach to the discovery of earnings management with some 
probability.  To equate this abstraction to our setting, classification shifting would cause 
shareholders to misestimate value based on latent core earnings, and our governance measures 
(e.g., independent boards) correspond to penalties for and detection of earnings management. 
12 Some prior studies report evidence that accrual manipulation decreases, while real activity 
manipulation increases, when stricter accounting standards or governance rules are adopted (Ewert 
and Wagenhofer 2005; Cohen et al. 2008).  If classification shifting is a relatively low cost 
mechanism to manipulate performance measures, increased regulation that reduces firms’ 
willingness to manipulate accruals across time could lead to an increase in classification shifting. 
Appendix A provides some insight on how different firms conceptualize core earnings.  Of course 
not all firms define their measure explicitly. 
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Estimating misclassified income-decreasing special items 
 To estimate unexpected core earnings (UE_CE), we use the error term from industry-year 
regressions of core earnings (CE) on lagged core earnings and control variables.  The regressions 
are based on McVay (2006) (Equation 1, subscripts “M”) and Fan et al. (2010) (Equation 2, 
subscripts “F”) as follows13:    
CEt = αM,0 + αM,1 CEt-1 + αM,2 ATOt + αM,3 ACCRUALSt-1 + αM,4 ACCRUALSt + αM,5 ∆SALESt  
   + αM,6 NEG∆SALESt  + εt               (1) 
CEt = αF,0 + αF,1 CEt-1 + αF,2 ATOt + αF,3 ACCRUALSt-1 + αF,4 ∆SALESt + αF,5 NEG∆SALESt  
   + αF,6 RETt + αF,7 RETt-1 + εt               (2) 
Appendix 2 defines these variables in detail.  Following McVay, CEt is captured by operating 
income before special items and before depreciation expense (i.e., revenues minus cost of goods 
sold and selling and administrative expenses); this is deflated by sales for year t.   
McVay (2006) provides a justification for the independent variables that capture the 
economic determinants of core earnings.  Lagged core earnings (CEt−1) controls for the serial 
correlation of core earnings, while the asset turnover ratio for year t (ATOt) has been shown to be 
inversely related to operating income deflated by sales (Nissim and Penman 2001).  Total accruals 
deflated by sales for year t (ACCRUALSt) control for normal core earning that are generated by 
firm performance (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 1994), while lagged total accruals 
(ACCRUALSt−1) are included based on empirical evidence on the ability of accruals to predict 
future earnings (Sloan 1996). Sales growth for year t (ΔSALESt) influences operating income 
deflated by sales by decreasing fixed costs per unit. Finally, negative sales growth for year t 
(NEGΔSALESt) captures potential asymmetric effects of sales growth when sales decline.  
McVay (2006) acknowledges that her evidence of classification shifting is sensitive to the 
inclusion of current period accruals as a performance control.  Fan et al. (2010) emphasize that 
                                                 
13 Industries are defined across 48 sectors as suggested in Fama and French (1997). 
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including current period accruals can lead to a violation of OLS assumptions, and a mechanically 
induced positive relation between unexpected core earnings and negative special items.  They 
replace current-period accruals with current and lagged stock returns (RETt and RETt−1).  Given 
the likely noise and unknown bias in our proxy for unexpected core earnings, we use both the 
McVay (2006) and Fan et al. (2010) models.   
In tests of pay-performance sensitivity, H2, the proxy for misclassified negative special 
items, CSt is either positive, or zero.  It is equal to unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt), provided 
this number is positive (i.e.,UE_CEt > 0) and provided negative special items scaled by revenues 
are non-zero (i.e., NSIt > 0).14  This definition intends to maximize the signal to noise in CS for the 
pay regressions.  Our reasoning is that since shifting expenses implies an overstatement of core 
earnings, positive excessive core earnings are likely a better indicator of classification shifting 
than negative excessive core earnings. Implicitly, our measurement scheme designates the 
combination of a negative UE_CE and a non-zero NSI as an instance where no classification 
shifting has occurred. Since UE_CE is unobservable and is measured with error, this procedure 
can cause us to miss valid classification shifting. Also we fail to measure classification shifting if 
this has actually occurred when special items are positive rather than negative.  
 Consistent with prior classification shifting studies, to validate the classification shifting 
metric and test H1, we regress unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt), which can be positive or 
negative, on negative special items (NSIt), i.e., 
UE_CEt = β1 NSIt + FE + εt      (3) 
Here FE is year- and firm-fixed effects (hence the lack of an intercept.) As in McVay (2006) and 
Fan et al. (2010), we interpret a positive coefficient on NSI to suggest that classification shifting is 
                                                 
14 Compustat combines special items that are shown on the income statement or disclosed in 
footnotes. NSI equals special items multiplied by –1 deflated by revenue if special items are 
negative and 0 otherwise. Special items are negative if negative elements such as restructuring 
charges dominate positive elements such as gains on sales of assets.  
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likely, (i.e., β1 > 0). In contrast, β1 = 0 suggests that unexpected core earnings are unrelated to 
negative special items and that expenses have not been classification-shifted.15   
Note that we make no attempt to reduce measurement error in our dependent variable for 
equation (3).  UE_CE is a noisier measure of classification shifting than CS.  If we were to use CS 
as the dependent variable in Equation 3 to test H1, given our definition of CS, there would be a 
mechanical positive relation between CS and NSI. 
Shielding CEO compensation from misclassified negative special items – Base case 
 We detect whether pay is shielded from special items by measuring the pay-performance 
sensitivity of total incentive pay (INCPAYt) to earnings before negative special items (EBNSI), to 
the classification-shifted component of negative special items (CS), and to the remaining 
component of negative special items (NSINCS).  Equation 4 defines this model. 
INCPAYt = γ1 NSINCS,t  + γ2 CSt + γ3 EBNSIt + CONTROLSt + FE + εt      (4) 
Specifically, total incentive pay, INCPAYt, is the logarithm of one plus CEO incentive pay, which 
is measured as the sum of cash incentives (i.e., annual bonus and non-equity incentive plan grants) 
and equity grants (i.e., restricted stock grants and option grants).  The coefficient, γ3 on earnings 
before negative special items (EBNSI) can be viewed as the base sensitivity of pay to core 
earnings. The coefficient on CS, γ2, implies shielding if it is zero, or if it is negative, partial 
shielding would apply if this coefficient is smaller in absolute value than the coefficient on 
EBNSI.  If the parameter is greater than zero, then classification-shifted expenses are treated in 
pay as if they represent positive net present value investing.  Our measure of the remaining 
component of negative special items (NSINCS) can be either positive (meaning it contains losses) 
or negative.  A negative coefficient on NSINCS, if smaller in absolute value than the coefficient on 
earnings, implies pay shielding. Based on the heterogeneous nature of NSINCS, it is difficult to 
                                                 
15 Assuming Equations 1 and 2 are well specified, a negative β1 suggests that poor performance is 
reflected in both unexpected core earnings and negative special items.   
14 
 
predict the magnitude of its compensation weighting.  
The control variables are inspired by Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1998).  In addition 
to including EBNSI, there are market-based performance measures: stock returns and negative 
stock returns (RETt and DNEG,t RETt).16  Risk-averse executives demand higher remuneration when 
operating performance is riskier; we control for this using the standard deviations of EBNSI and 
RET estimated using the past five years (STDEBNSIt and STDRETt). Investment opportunities 
(INVOPPt) are captured using the past five-year average market-to-book ratio of total assets. The 
logarithm of total assets at the start of year t (LOGASSETSt-1) captures the response of pay to 
managerial effort or ability that is assumed to be in proportion to firm size.  
Effects of regulatory changes in corporate governance on compensation shielding  
 To test our two hypotheses using the difference-in-differences approach, we employ 
board or committee independence as proxies for the strength of corporate governance. We also 
identify the year 2002 as giving rise to an exogenous shift in board independence, particularly for 
the subset of firms that had weaker governance.  Similar to Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) 
and Duchin et al. (2010), we compare classification shifting and compensation shielding between 
firms that were, or were not, already in compliance with the board independence requirements 
prior to 2002.  Firms that were non-compliant prior to 2002 were forced to comply with new 
standards from 2002, and this is the “treatment” effect of the new regulations for some firms. 
The tests use three different sets of treatment and control firms for three different aspects 
of the 2002 independence requirements.  Specifically, we define treatment and control firms for 
the two separate requirements that audit and compensation committees be 100% independent, and 
for a third requirement that the overall board comprise at least 50% independent directors.  
The use of 2002 as the intervention year for the imposition of independence rules follows 
                                                 
16 Allowing different pay sensitivity to negative returns is based on Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman 
(2006).  
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prior research.  The actual timing of the regulation was not precise. On December 14, 1999, the 
SEC approved suggested amendments to the listing standards of NYSE and NASDAQ17 requiring 
all audit committee members to be independent directors.  However, as of 1999, the term 
“independence” was not well defined.  This rule was amended in 2002 following the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals. In addition to reiterating the 100% independent audit committee membership 
rule, the NYSE and NASDAQ offered a more formal, stricter definition of the term 
“independent.”  In 2002, the NYSE also proposed that the majority of the overall board and all 
compensation committee members be independent. These listing rules were approved by the SEC 
in 2003, and took effect with firms’ first annual meeting after January 15, 2004. 
To identify treatment and control firms, we examine compliance with the various post-
SOX independence rules as of the start of 2000, at which time firms would not have known of the 
upcoming mandated changes.  We also check for compliance at fiscal year-end 2000 and 2001 
using the IRRC/RiskMetrics indicator, I.18  A treatment (control) firm must be identified as non-
compliant (compliant) every year (i.e., in 1999, 2000, and 2001) to be retained in our sample.   We 
define a dummy variable, NCOMPLY, equal to one for each firm-year, pre- (and post-) 2002 for 
the treatment firms, and zero for the control firms.  To ensure that control firms were in 
compliance with post-SOX standards prior to entering our sample, we drop 1999 observations.   
A second dummy variable, POST, is one in 2003–2006 and zero for 2000 and 2001.  By 
interacting POST and NCOMPLY variables with CS and NSINCS, including main effects and a 
three-way interaction, we compare firms in- and out of- compliance, before and after 2002.  We 
                                                 
17 The amended listing requirements evolved from the Blue Ribbon Committee on Audit 
Effectiveness, formed at the request of the SEC chairman, Arthur Levitt in September 1998.  Klein 
(2003), and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) provide helpful background, repeated here for the 
reader’s convenience. 
18 IRRC/RiskMetrics codes a director as independent if she or he is unaffiliated with the company. 
For example, directors who are former employees of the firm, or of a major customer or service 
provider of the firm, are not independent. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) point out that the 
IRRC/RiskMetrics independence definitions are stricter than the true 2002 exchange requirements. 
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remove the first-year regulatory transition effects by dropping 2002 observations. The sample ends 
in 2006 to avoid confounding effects of the financial crisis.    
We adapt the base-case regressions (Equations 3 and 4), including fixed effects:  
UE_CEt = β1 NSIt + β2 NSIt×NCOMPLYt + β3 NSIt×POSTt + β4 NCOMPLYt ×POSTt ×NSIt  
+ β5 NCOMPLYt  + β6 POSTt + β7 NCOMPLYt ×POSTt  + FE + εt             (5) 
 
INCPAYt = (γ1 + γ3 NCOMPLYt + γ5 POSTt + γ7 NCOMPLYt ×POSTt)×NSINCS,t  
+ (γ2 + γ4 NCOMPLYt + γ6 POSTt + γ8 NCOMPLYt ×POSTt)×CSt  + γ9 NCOMPLYt 
+ γ10 POSTt + γ11 NCOMPLYt ×POSTt + γ12 EBNSIt  + CONTROLSt + FE + εt        (6) 
 
In Equation 5, β3, the coefficient on NSI×POST, captures the effect on classification shifting of the 
governance and accounting changes that occurred after 2002 (e.g., SOX and FAS 146).  We 
expect β3 to be negative under H1.  Similarly, the incremental effect of board and committee 
independence for non-compliant firms after SOX is captured by β4 which multiplies 
NCOMPLY×POST×NSI.  This coefficient should be negative if more intense scrutiny of 
accounting (i.e., higher board independence) reduces classification shifting. 
In Equation 6, the coefficient on POST×CS, γ6, reveals the effect of SOX regulatory 
reforms, generally, on the compensation shielding of classification-shifted expenses.  Under H2, 
we conjecture γ6 is negative. We expect the coefficient on NCOMPLY×POST×CS, γ8, to be 
negative because it picks up the incremental effect of improvements in board independence on 
compensation shielding. 
Cross-sectional tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 To complement and extend our analysis to a longer time period, we employ a cross-
sectional association regression using a time-varying index to capture the strength of corporate 
governance.  We use factor analysis to reduce a set of nine firm characteristics to a continuous 
corporate governance index (GOVt, see Appendix 2).  We appeal to Core et al. (1998) and Hartzell 
and Starks (2003) for the inputs to the factor model.  These inputs measure the degree of 
management entrenchment, the monitoring intensity of the board, and the degree of shareholder-
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manager incentive alignment (captured through ownership).  Board-specific variables comprise 
the following: an indicator for CEO duality, board size, the ratio of independent directors, 
independent directors over age 69, and busy directors on multiple boards (Core et al. 1998).  
Ownership structure variables comprise the following: CEO ownership as a percentage of shares 
outstanding, an indicator for non-CEO insiders with ownership greater than 5%, the number of 
outside block holders with ownership over 5%, and institutional investors’ ownership as a 
percentage of shares outstanding.  
We test for the mediating effect of this broad measure of governance on classification 
shifting and compensation shielding using the following equations.   
UE_CEt = δ1 NSIt + δ2 GOVt  + δ3 NSIt×GOVt  + FE + εt               (7) 
INCPAYt = λ1 NSINCS,t  + λ2 CSt  + λ3 GOVt + λ4 NSINCS,t ×GOVt + λ5 CSt ×GOVt  
                       + λ6 EBNSIt  + CONTROLSt + FE + εt               (8) 
 
These regressions are estimated for the full sample (1995–2012). They capture the long-term 
relation between managers’ incentive for classification shifting and boards’ tolerance for 
compensation shielding, conditional on firm characteristics and operating environment. We 
examine H1 by testing if δ3, the coefficient on NSI × GOV, is negative.  Our hypothesis on 
compensation shielding, H2 examines if λ5, the coefficient on CS×GOV, is negative.   
4.  Empirical results 
Description of sample 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure. We obtain financial data 
from the Compustat/CRSP merged dataset, stock return data from CRSP, data on boards of 
directors and compensation committees from RiskMetrics, institutional ownership data from 
Thompson Financial, and CEO compensation data from ExecuComp. We merge the ExecuComp 
CEO data with data from the Compustat/CRSP merged file. IRRC/Riskmetrics began reporting on 
director independence in 1995, so we further restrict our sample period to 1995–2012. Following 
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McVay (2006), we exclude firm-years that have sales of less than one million dollars. Since the 
estimation of unexpected operating income requires industry-year regressions, we delete 
observations pertaining to industry-years with less than 15 observations (McVay 2006). We 
identify the CEO as the person in office for at least six months of a fiscal year using the tags 
available in ExecuComp. In the case of duplicate CEOs for a year, we select the person that 
received the largest total annual compensation. To allow for firm-fixed effects, firm-years must 
have both current- and prior-year data for all of the variables used in Equations 1 to 4. The final 
sample consists of 2,244 firms and 16,795 observations during the period 1995–2012. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Panels B and C of Table 1 
provide the number of firm-year observations for each industry and each fiscal year.    
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for variables used in the cross-sectional regressions 
(our largest sample).  Panel A reports the median of CEO total incentive pay is $1.51 million, 
while median earnings before negative special items deflated by sales, EBNSI, are 6.5 percent and 
median annual stock returns, RET, are 8.7 percent.  Unexpected core earnings, UE_CE, average 
2% of sales and 1.6% of sales for the McVay and Fan et al. models. Negative special items, NSI, 
average 2.1% of sales, and in more than half (exactly, 52.7 percent) of the total observations, NSI 
is positive, suggesting that reporting negative special items is common.19 In 30.2 percent of the 
total observations, the proxy for classification shifting, CS, is positive.20  The variable, INDBD is a 
count, for each firm-year, whether the audit committee, compensation committee, and overall 
board structure meets thresholds for independence (see Appendix A).  More than half of the firm-
                                                 
19 NSIs represent a mixing together of losses and gains (such as gains on sale of assets) but losses 
have greater magnitude than gains. Therefore, NSINCS can be positive or negative. 
20 Untabulated results indicate that approximately 44 percent of misclassified negative special 
items in year t−1 reoccur in year t compared with 68 percent for total negative special items. 
About 60% (4992/8387) of negative restructuring charges are associated with classification 
shifting, CS, in the first year of a restructuring, while about 40% measure a positive CS on 
recurrence (2026/5701). 
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year observations are characterized by independence on all three dimensions. 
Panel B shows differences in means of key variables between the pre- and post-SOX 
periods where the post-SOX period is further decomposed into the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
CEO total incentive pay, firm size, and corporate governance variables display an increasing trend, 
while accounting and market performance variables have fluctuated with the boom and bust 
periods that coincide with the pre- and post- SOX periods. Despite FAS 146, classification-shifted 
expenses, CS, are statistically indistinguishable, pre- and post-2002. 
We estimate the difference-in-differences results using smaller samples ranging from 
2,218 to 3,208 observations.  Panel C provides some descriptive information on the compensation 
committee partitions in the pre-SOX period.  The firms with the least independent compensation 
committees are somewhat smaller than their control sample, i.e., based on the mean log of total 
assets (7.304 versus 7.572), and somewhat less profitable (i.e., mean EBNSI is 6.6% versus 7.4%). 
The log of total incentive pay, INCPAY, is also smaller for the non-compliant group (1.006 versus 
1.204), consistent with this groups’ smaller asset base.  The group of firms with highest 
independence in the pre-SOX period have statistically larger NSI (0.020 versus 0.015), and have 
larger CS (0.025 versus 0.020).  Other group differences are not statistically significant. 
Note that the difference-in-differences approach allows the two groups of firms to differ 
from one another in the pre-SOX and post-SOX period, but valid tests depend on the model being 
complete. To the extent the two groups are dissimilar, the dissimilarities are captured by control 
variables. We also assume that these control variables are mapped to the dependent variable via 
the linear specification we use. 
 Base-case regressions for classification shifting and compensation shielding      
Table 3 reports the base-case regression models for classification shifting and for 
compensation shielding.  In Panel A, Columns (a) and (b) show that regressing UE_CEt on NSIt 
produces a positive and significant coefficient on NSIt (0.258) for the McVay (2006) model and a 
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negative and significant coefficient on NSIt (-0.077) for the Fan et al. (2010) model. The signs of 
these coefficients are consistent with the prior two papers, but magnitudes are not directly 
comparable due to our inclusion of firm- and year-fixed effects.  Despite the negative coefficient 
on NSI, Fan et al. (2010) conclude, using cross-sectional variation in the coefficient on NSI, that 
classification shifting occurs, e.g., in the fourth quarter of each year, or when accruals 
management is constrained.   
Panel B contains results of estimating the base-case compensation regression (Equation 
4).  In all columns, the coefficient on earnings before negative special items, EBNSI, is about 
0.63.  In Column (a), the coefficient on NSI is -0.311—about half the size of the coefficient on 
EBNSI (t=3.25 for the difference in coefficients) consistent with partial shielding on average. 
Though not tabulated, this coefficient is more negative after 2002 implying pay became more 
sensitive to negative special items in the post-SOX period. 
In Columns (b) and (c), NSI is decomposed into the classification-shifted component of 
negative special items, CS, and the non-classification-shifted component of negative special items, 
NSINCS.  The coefficient on CS is more negative than that on NSINCS (e.g., -0.452 on CS and -
0.208 on NSINCS in column (b)).  Tests for coefficient equality reported at the bottom of Table 3 
suggest these coefficients are statistically different for the McVay model, but not for the Fan et al. 
model.21 In untabulated results, the absolute value of the coefficient on CS is less than the 
coefficient on EBNSI for both models, consistent with partial shielding.22   
Tests of H1 and H2 using a natural experiment 
Table 4 contains tests of our main hypotheses using the natural experiment in which the 
                                                 
21  We examined whether compensation shielding is less prevalent when restructuring charges 
repeat as in Adut et al.  We confirm that one-time restructuring charges are shielded more than are 
restructuring charges in a sequence.  
22 In the period 2003–2012, the coefficient on CS is significantly negative, and its absolute value is 
insignificantly different from the coefficient on EBNSI. 
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stock exchange rulings and SOX reforms imposed independence on our test firms. The table 
contains six columns representing two different classification schemes (McVay 2006 and Fan et 
al. 2010) and three different sets of test and control firms (based on audit and compensation 
committee compliance in the first four columns and total board compliance in the last two).   
The evidence in Panel A of Table 4 weakly supports base-level classification shifting: 
point estimates on NSI are positive across all columns. They are reliably different from zero for 
the McVay model in Columns (a), (c), and (e), but they are significant for the Fan et al. model 
only in Column (f).  Also, the coefficients on NSI×NCOMPLY do not differ from zero or are 
negative and statistically significant (Columns (c), McVay and (f), Fan et al.), so we conclude the 
two groups’ have similar shifting behavior in the period leading up to SOX.  
Recall that we expect negative coefficients for NSI×POST and NSI×NCOMPLY×POST 
if classification shifting is reduced as accounting scrutiny increases (H1).  While the coefficients 
on NSI×POST have negative point estimates, they are statistically significant only for the half of 
the columns based on Fan et al. (2010) model.23 Further, the coefficients on 
NSI×NCOMPLY×POST vary in sign and do not differ from zero. These coefficients capture 
whether firms with formerly non-independent board firms reduced classification shifting more in 
the post 2000 period when board independence was mandated.  The results fail to support H1. 
  Overall, aside from the negative tendency in the coefficient on NSI after 2002, there is 
little support for our first hypothesis that stronger governance is associated with less classification 
shifting. This result will be surprising to those who believe that audit and compensation 
                                                 
23 If we replace firm-fixed effects with Fama-French industry effects and employ firm clustering 
of standard errors, the coefficient on NSI×Post is negative in all columns.  The evidence appears 
to be contrary to the conjecture in Kolev et al. (2008) that classification shifting of recurring 
expenses increased following 2002.  Rather, our data are more consistent with conclusions drawn 
by Lee (2014) using a different research method that SFAS 146, through its stricter verification 
rules around restructuring charges, reduced discretion over restructuring charges (i.e., some 
readers might say there is weak evidence of less classification shifting.) 
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committees with more independence will put more effort into detecting and punishing earning 
management.  As mentioned in Section 2, such an increase in monitoring and penalties can 
increase pay-performance sensitivity (discussed next), which can indirectly motivate additional 
earnings management.  Hence, H1 is subject to tension when pay-performance sensitivity can shift 
in response to better performance measures (see Goldman and Slezak 2006). 
While the equilibrium relation between earnings management and incentive contracts 
provides a plausible explanation for our failure to reject the null, other scenarios are possible.  For 
example, SOX called for greater penalties on types of earnings manipulation (e.g., bonus 
clawbacks for accounting restatements).  Unlike accrual manipulation, classification shifting does 
not change bottom-line earnings and thus creates a lower risk of restatement; hence, managers 
could be substituting accrual manipulation for classification shifting to some extent.  
Another reason we can fail to reject the null in Panel A, is that the construct for more 
intense accounting scrutiny—an increase in board independence—may be invalid.  For example, 
firm outsiders may be less able to detect earnings management because they lack firm-specific or 
industry knowledge; our research design is premised on idea that independent board members are 
free from the influence of the CEO and work harder to monitor, but checks and balances may be 
insufficient. Finally, a failure to reject the null can also be due to measurement error in estimated 
excessive core earnings, which we discussed in Section 2. 
 Results of testing H2 that compensation shielding is less likely for more independent 
boards are contained in Table 4 Panel B.  The coefficient translating earnings before negative 
special items into incentive compensation ranges between 1.578 (Column (c)) and 1.057 (Column 
(e)) and is highly significant.24  The statistically insignificant coefficients in the first row labelled 
NSINCS suggest that boards did not penalize or reward executives for this component of negative 
                                                 
24 Assuming a coefficient equal to 1, a one standard deviation increase in earnings before negative 
special items (.128) translates into a $136,553 pay increase ([𝑒 .128 − 1) × 1,000,000]). 
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special items. The base coefficient on CS, classification-shifted expenses, is positive across all 
columns and is statistically significant in all but two ((a), and (f)). So, our measure of 
classification shifting, CS (recall this is excessively positive core earnings) corresponds to an 
earnings component that translates on average into increased pay for executives.  
 H2 predicts that pay sensitivity to classification-shifted expenses is reduced post 2002; 
support for this hypothesis is indicated by the negative and significant coefficients on CS×POST 
in all six columns ((a) to (f)).  In addition, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
CS×POST×NCOMPLY in Columns (a), (b), and (d), provides evidence in support of our 
hypothesis that strengthening the independence of audit and compensation committees is 
associated with less compensation-shielding of our proxy for classification-shifted expenses.25 The 
suggested reduction in compensation shielding implies non-trivial pay cuts. Using the coefficients 
in Column (a), a one standard deviation increase in classification-shifted expenses (5.4% of annual 
sales for McVay model, Table 2),  in combination with a mandated independent compensation 
committee, implies a pay cut of approximately $137,620 (= 1 million×[Exp(-2.741×0.054) – 1]). 
The combination of mandated independence along with the post 2002 general effect implies a pay 
cut of approximately $230,786 (=$1 million ×[Exp((-2.118 -2.741) ×0.054) – 1]).  
   However, in Columns (e) and (f) containing treatment and control firms based on 
overall board independence (i.e., requiring more than 50% of board members to be independent 
directors), the data suggest no difference across the two groups (i.e., the coefficients on 
CS×NCOMPLY and CS×POST×NCOMPLY are not different from zero.)  Of course, overall 
board requirements are less stringent than committee impendence requirements. This lower 
standard for independence at the overall board level versus committees provides some rationale 
for differences in inferences for the last two columns of this table versus the first four columns. 
                                                 
25 The coefficient (-1.375) in Column (c), McVay model, audit committee sample is not quite 
significant, t = -1.55. 
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 This research design relies on the idea that the general effects of SOX affect all firms in 
the same way through the variable POST. Other governance effects flow through the NCOMPLY 
interactions.  While the model allows SOX to affect the control variables, the coefficients on the 
control variables are held constant over time and across the test and control firms. 
As a robustness check we relaxed some of these model restrictions by allowing the 
coefficient on earnings before negative special items (EBNSI) to vary with NCOMPLY and 
POST.  This variation on the empirical model allows for SOX-related changes in pay-sensitivity to 
overall earnings, to flow through EBNSI, along with the changes in pay sensitivity to CS.  The 
unreported results of this estimation support our inferences for Table 4, if independence is defined 
with reference to compensation committees. That is, expenses suspected of being classification-
shifted, CS, receive higher (meaning more negative) pay sensitivity in the post 2002 period, and 
the effect is larger for firms who faced the largest changes in independence, NCOMPLY. There is 
also a higher pay sensitivity to CS in general after SOX (i.e., the coefficient on CS×POST is 
negative.) For the remaining four sample strategies (i.e., Columns (c)–(f)), there continues to be a 
general post-SOX reduction in compensation shielding, but there is not an incremental effect for 
audit committee independence or a single board independence.  Also, untabulated results indicate 
that the pay-sensitivity to EBNSI does not vary statistically, pre- versus post-SOX, or based on 
committee independence.  These results suggest first, that the estimated effects of increased pay 
sensitivity to classification-shifted expenses are most robust where compliance is defined by 
compensation committee independence, and second, and that our original specification that 
constrains the coefficient on EBNSI to be constant is appropriate.  
 Overall, we interpret the evidence in Table 4 to support H2: compensation shielding of 
classification-shifted expenses is reduced when compensation committees and audit committees 
are forced to be more independent. The table also suggests that compensation shielding was 
reduced in conjunction with governance reforms that took place in 2002, regardless of whether or 
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not firms were in compliance with board independence requirements.   
Cross-sectional tests of H1 and H2 
In Table 5 we use a broader measure of corporate governance (formed through factor 
analysis, GOV) and the full set of sample firm-years described in Table 2. The GOV measure 
includes a weighting on board independence, but also it intends to capture concepts such as CEO 
entrenchment, external monitoring, and agency cost magnitudes. This broadened definition of 
governance affects our inferences regarding H1.  In Panel A, the coefficient on NSI×GOV is 
significantly negative in both Columns (a) and (b), suggesting that managers engage in 
classification shifting to a lesser extent when corporate governance is relatively strong.  In 
addition, the results in this table have similar implications to those of Table 5 with regard to 
compensation shielding; in Panel B the coefficient on CS×GOV is reliably negative, suggesting 
that well-governed firms are less likely to shield CEO pay from classification-shifted expenses 
Overall, this cross-sectional test supports both hypotheses.   
Contrasting our two main tests of H1, Table 4 finds little evidence in support of H1, 
Table 5 suggests the opposite. While we cannot be sure the reasons for the differences, it is 
possible that Table 5 employs a more relevant measure of governance, as applied to classification 
shifting.26 In addition, the number of observations in Table 5 likely adds power to our test.  
5.  Additional Analyses 
The role of audit quality  
The governance factors that influence compensation shielding could be different than 
those influencing classification shifting.  One factor overlooked so far is the role of the external 
auditor. Since negative special items tend to be material, they draw the attention of auditors, and 
                                                 
26 Results using a board independence index (INDBD, instead of GOV) provide consistent evidence 
to support H2 but not H1. See Appendix 2 for definition of INDBD. Because these results are so 
similar to Table 4, they are not tabulated in the interest of brevity. The results that support 
classification shifting rely on the broader governance measure, GOV.   
26 
 
this could cause managers to be more conservative in their decision to classification shift.  In fact, 
prior research by Haw et al. (2011) finds a mediating effect of Big 4 audit quality on classification 
shifting in East Asian countries.  We replicate the specification in Table 5 using a change in audit 
quality indicator to explore the relation between audit quality and classification shifting.  We 
employ changes in audit quality rather than level of audit quality, (i.e., an indicator for Big 4 
auditor) because the level is very sticky over time. In our sample there are 785 auditor changes: 
663 are auditor changes from a non-Big 4 or from a Big-4 auditor to a (different) Big-4 auditor 
and 122 are auditor changes from a Big 4 or from a non-Big-4 auditor to a (different) non-Big 4 
auditor.27 Panel A of Table 6 shows the predicted reduction in classification shifting when firms 
switched to higher audit quality (NSI×CH_AUB4), while it shows an increase in classification 
shifting when audit quality weakens (NSI×CH_AUNB4).28  
 In parallel with other tests, we explored the relation between audit quality changes and 
pay shielding.  Panel B of Table 6 shows evidence that there is less compensation shielding of 
classification-shifted expenses when audit quality improves (i.e., the coefficient on 
CS×CH_AUB4 is negative and significant); however, the coefficients for lower quality, 
CS×CH_AUNB4 are statistically insignificant.29   
The role of the extent of overlap between compensation and audit committees 
                                                 
27 Our audit-quality improvement measure includes 82 switches from non-Big-4 to Big-4 along 
with 616 switches between Big-4 auditors. The idea that switches among Big-4 is indicative of 
audit quality improvements is somewhat debateable. The proposal that firms should be forced into 
mandatory rotation of auditors is based on the notion that longer tenure leads to less independence. 
However, empirically, some studies link higher quality to longer tenure (e.g., Ghosh and Moon 
2005). Our audit decrease indicator includes 47 switches from a Big-4 to non-Big 4, and 82 
switches between non-Big 4 auditors (e.g., indicating lower quality under opinion shopping). 
28 If we denote high quality auditing using the “sticky” indicator for Big 4 versus non-Big 4, we 
find a negative influence of high quality auditing on classification shifting but this effect is 
statistically significant for the Fan et al. (2010) model and not for the McVay (2006) model. 
29 A reviewer suggested we investigate excess audit fees and their relation to our two hypotheses.  
We used the approach in Choi, Kim, Kim and Zang (2010). The results reveal coefficients 
opposite to H1 and H2.  Perhaps excess audit fees are a proxy for auditor client bonding.  
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 Cross-membership of a board’s compensation and audit committees (hereafter, 
overlapping membership) could relate to classification shifting or compensation shielding. Our 
prior beliefs were that overlapping membership would enable a valuable transfer of accounting 
information from the audit function to the compensation function (and vice versa), thereby 
assisting in mitigating moral hazard by the CEO.  However, Laux and Laux (2009) provide 
assumptions for which overlapping membership leads to a moral hazard condition for the audit 
committee members. In Laux and Laux, the best governance structure would avoid committee 
membership overlaps to reduce the effects of this moral hazard.30 We explore whether overlapping 
membership affects compensation shielding, and whether this is mediated by strongly independent 
members on the audit committee (who, we assume are less subject to the moral hazard problem 
raised in Laux and Laux.)    
We form an indicator variable for relatively high overlapping membership (AUDCOMP), 
which equals one if the percentage of compensation committee members with overlapping 
membership on the audit and compensation committees exceeds the sample median and zero 
otherwise.31 We also measure an indicator variable for an independent audit committee, INDAUD, 
which equals one if all audit committee members are independent directors and attend more than 
75% of board meetings.  We are uncertain if AUDCOMP will increase or decrease classification 
shifting and (or) shielding.  An increase would be consistent with Laux and Laux.  We predict, as 
in prior tables that independent board members will lead to less compensation shielding and 
classification shifting. 
                                                 
30 Laux and Laux assume audit committee members internalize a personal effort cost in their role 
as overseers of accounting, whereas the compensation committee members do not have an 
analogous personal cost.  If a board member sits on both committees, moral hazard costs are 
increased due to this board member’s inability to treat the audit effort cost at arms-length. 
31 As shown in Table 7 by the +/- prediction, we are uncertain whether AUDCOMP should 
increase shifting and compensation shielding (consistent with Laux and Laux) or, if this should 
decrease shifting and compensation shielding consistent with efficient information transfer. 
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 Table 7, Panel A, suggests the effects of overlapping membership and independence on 
classification shifting are statistically significant for McVay model, but are insignificant under the 
Fan et al. These inconsistencies make us unwilling to draw conclusions.  Panel B shows the data 
support a negative coefficient on INDAUD× CS, consistent with H2.  In addition, the three-way 
interaction term CS×INDAUD×AUDTCOMP has a negative coefficient, suggesting that the 
influence of monitoring by the independent audit committee on compensation shielding is more 
effective when there is a higher overlapping membership. However, the positive coefficient on CS 
× AUDCOMP is consistent with Laux and Laux’s model that a higher overlapping membership 
provides less effective board oversight. Overall, we conclude that any synergistic effect of 
overlapping membership on compensation shielding is amplified by the presence of independent 
and hardworking audit committee members. 
Using CFO total incentives as an alternative dependent variable 
Our tabulated results focus on CEOs rather than CFOs. This enhances comparability with 
prior studies on compensation shielding.  Moreover, CEOs who have overall responsibility for 
firm performance are likely to have more influence over the strategic decisions that lead to 
negative special items (e.g., restructuring.) In addition, they exert control over financial reporting 
by monitoring and rewarding the activities of CFOs. However, CFOs can also possibly obtain 
personal financial gain through classification shifting. To examine this idea, we follow Jiang et al. 
(2010) to identify CFOs and re-estimate Panels A of Tables 4 to 5 using CFO level data.  We find 
no statistically significant support for our main hypotheses.  
The effect of say-on-pay voting 
Another regulatory focus in our sample period has been CEO pay.  In 2006, the SEC 
adopted new requirements in proxy statements to disclose more components of pay. In addition, 
mandated but non-binding initiatives for shareholder opinions on pay were implemented in 2010.  
We examined whether compensation shielding is related to shareholder sentiment on pay, 
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confirming that more favorable votes are associated with lower pay overall, but finding no 
interactive effects with negative special items.32 
6.  Conclusion 
Annual compensation for top executives responds more to earnings before special items 
than to the unusual or infrequent charges that comprise special items. In this paper, we start with 
the premise that the practice of shielding executive compensation from these unusual or infrequent 
charges provides an incentive for top managers to overstate special items and influence current 
pay.  We examine whether executives appear to vertically shift current expenses into special items 
for the pay side-effect, and also whether strong corporate governance mediates either the 
classification shifting behavior or the pay consequences of classification shifting (aka 
compensation shielding).  Corporate governance reforms that took place in 2002 provide a quasi-
experimental design to address the empirical challenge that governance structure is endogenously 
assigned to corporations.  We present two hypotheses: first, that stronger governance reduces a 
firm’s engagement in classification shifting, and second, that stronger governance leads to less 
compensation shielding.  However, agency theoretic models of the interplay between governance, 
pay-performance sensitivity and earnings management provide arguments suggesting that these 
hypotheses are subject to tension.  These models do not predict unambiguously that earnings 
management will decrease following improvements in detection and increasing penalties for 
manipulation of performance. 
Using two different research design strategies, the quasi-experiment and cross-sectional 
tests, we find evidence consistent with our second hypothesis (that stronger governance is less 
willing to pay for classification-shifted expenses), but mixed evidence for the first hypothesis (that 
stronger governance reduces classification shifting magnitudes).  The data support the idea that 
                                                 
32 We borrowed hand-collected data on the voting outcomes for a set of 1,129 firms from Jenny 
Zhang and Shuo Yang.  
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firms are less willing to protect CEO pay from classification-shifted expenses after SOX, and this 
effect is more intense for firms that experienced a mandated increase in audit and compensation 
committee independence. These results are strongest if governance is captured by compensation 
committee independence, as opposed to audit committee independence or general board 
independence. The results for pay-shielding are supported by additional cross-sectional analysis 
using an alternative measure of governance. 
 Using the quasi-experiment, the data do not suggest that board, or committee 
independence reduces classification shifting per se or that classification shifting is reduced post 
2002.  As a matter of fact, audit committee independence is not a predictor of lower classification 
shifting.  This result, while not inconsistent with theory, could arise from a variety of real-world 
deviations from theory.  One possibility is that independent audit committee members lack the 
firm-specific knowledge to make the audit function more precise. On the other hand, when we use 
a broader measure of governance, expanded to include weightings on other proxies for monitoring, 
we find that stronger governance in the cross-section is associated with less classification shifting.  
Also, changes in audit quality, either improving or degrading, are associated as predicted with 
classification shifting. 
These cross-sectional findings are intriguing, but the lack of correspondence in results 
with the quasi-experiment is unsettling.  Foremost, the measurement of classification shifting is 
challenging, so the failure to reject the null for our first hypothesis (that classification shifting is 
unaffected by strong governance) is difficult to interpret.  In fact, measurement error alone could 
lead to low power tests. Often the classification shifting results vary depending on which model 
(McVay 2006 or Fan et al. 2010) that we use. In the end, we resist drawing strong conclusions 
regarding the effects of governance on classification shifting. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Examples of the disclosure of the adjustment of performance measures in recognition of unusual 
or infrequent events (i.e., special items) 
Case 1: GENERAL ELECTRIC (proxy statement for 2007) 
“For payment of long-term performance awards granted under the 2007 Plan, the company would 
use one or more of the following business measurements: sales, revenue, net income, net earnings, 
earnings per share, return on total capital, return on equity, cash flow, operating profit, and margin 
rate, subject to adjustment by the MDCC to remove the effect of charges for restructurings, 
discontinued operations, extraordinary items, and all items of gain, loss or expense determined to 
be extraordinary or unusual in nature or infrequent in occurrence, related to the disposal of a 
segment or a business, or related to a change in accounting principle or otherwise. The MDCC 
may establish performance goals that are measured either individually, alternatively or in any 
combination, applied to either the company as a whole or to a business unit or related company, 
and measured either annually or cumulatively over a period of years, on an absolute basis or 
relative to a pre-established target, to a previous year’s results or to a designated comparison 
group, in each case as specified by the MDCC in the award” [emphasis mine]. 
 
Case 2: WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC. (Proxy statement for year 2008)  
2008 Bonus Plan Design  
“The Committee varies the performance measures and the weights assigned to each performance 
measure from year to year based on current year business objectives. For 2008 bonuses the 
Committee selected the following performance measures and relative weights which apply to 
executives and almost 3,000 of our senior managers: net operating profit: 30 percent, noninterest 
expense: 25 percent, depositor and other retail banking fees: 25 percent, and customer loyalty: 20 
percent. Net operating profit will be calculated before income taxes and excluding the effects of 
loan loss provisions other than related to our credit card business and expenses related to 
foreclosed real estate assets. Noninterest expense will be calculated excluding expenses related to 
business resizing or restructuring and expenses related to foreclosed real estate assets. For each of 
these performance measures, the Committee established a range of achievement levels from zero 
to 150 percent of target. Like the 2007 plan, the 2008 Leadership Bonus Plan bonus payout targets 
range up to 365 percent of 2008 base salary, depending on position. In evaluating financial 
performance, the Committee may adjust results to eliminate the effects of charges for 
restructurings, discontinued operations, extraordinary items and items of gain, loss or expense 
determined to be extraordinary or unusual in nature or infrequent in occurrence or related to the 
disposal of a segment or a business or related to a change in accounting principle” [emphasis 
mine]. 
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Appendix 2     Definition of Variables 
Determinants of expected core earnings 
CEt−k = Core earnings deflated by sales for year t−k (k = 0, 1), measured as 
operating income before depreciation (COMPUSTAT oibdp) 
ATOt = Operating asset turnover for year t, which is measured as sales divided by 
average net operating asset   
Accrualst−k = Total accruals in year t−k (k = 0, 1), which is earnings before extraordinary 
items less cash flows from operating activities deflated by sales 
ΔSALESt = Sales growth rate for year t, which is measured as (salest − salest−1)/salest−1 
NEGΔSALESt = ΔSALESt if less than zero and zero otherwise 
RETt = Annual stock returns (including dividends) for year t 
RETt-1 = Annual stock returns (including dividends) for year t-1 
Classification shifting measures 
NSIt 
= Negative special items deflated by sales (measured as positive values) in 
year t. NSIt is (−1) × Compustat spi/sale if spi is negative and 0 otherwise. 
CSt  
 
 
 
 
= Estimated core expenses misclassified as NSIs in year t for the estimation 
of CSt  First, expected core earnings are estimated using each industry-year 
pair for the period 1990–2012. Equations 1 and 2 in Section 3 show the 
expected core earnings models. Second, unexpected core earnings in year t 
(UE_CEt) are core earnings in year t minus expected core earnings in year t. 
Estimated core expenses misclassified as NSIs in year t (CSt) equal UE_CEt 
if both UE_CEt and NSIt are positive for year t, and zero otherwise.  
NSINCS, t = The portion of NSI which is not classification shifted (i.e., NSIt − CSt) 
Executive compensation 
INCPAYt  = The logarithm of one plus total incentive pay awarded to CEO based on 
year t firm performance. Total incentive pay includes cash incentive and 
equity grants. Cash incentive is measured as the sum of the annual bonus 
and non-equity incentive plan. The missing values for the non-equity 
incentive plan before 2006 are replaced with long-term incentive payout 
(ExecuComp ltip). Equity grants are the sum of stock grants and option 
grants. An inflation adjustment is made to 2000 constant dollars based on 
the consumer price index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
EBNSIt = Income before extraordinary items and results of discontinued operations 
plus negative special items deflated by sales for year t 
STDEBNSIt = Standard deviation of EBNSIt during the period t−5 to t−1 
RETt = Annual stock returns (including common dividends) for year t 
DNEG,t×RETt = Negative annual stock returns for year t 
STDRETt = Standard deviation of RETt during the period t−5 to t−1 
INVOPPt = Investment opportunity at the start of year t, which is measured as the five-
year average of the market-to-book total asset ratio for the period t−5 to 
t−1. The market value of total assets is the book value of total assets minus 
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the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity 
LOGASSETSt = The logarithm of lagged total assets in inflation-adjusted dollars 
Corporate governance variables 
NCOMPLYt = An indicator for all firms that had not complied with the SOX provision on 
the independence of the board of directors and its compensation or audit 
committees prior to the enactment of SOX. NCOMPLYt equals one if less 
than 100% of committee members (50% of board members) are 
independent directors and zero otherwise at the first shareholders’ meeting 
occurring after the end of year 1999, and these firms had met the non-
compliance condition at the first shareholders meetings held after the end 
of 2000 and 2001, respectively.  
POSTt = An indicator variable for the post-SOX period which equals one for the 
2003–2006 period and zero for the period 1995–2001 period 
INDBD,t = An index for overall independence of board and committees. INDBD, t = 
INDCOMP, t + INDAUD, t + INDBOARD, t, where an indicator for compensation 
(audit) committee independence, INDCOMP, t (INDAUD, t), is one if all 
committee members are independent directors (IRRC ‘I’) and attend more 
than 3/4 of board meetings in a year, and zero otherwise; and an indicator 
for independence of a single board, INDBOARD, t, is one if over 2/3 of board 
members are independent directors and attend more than 3/4 of board 
meetings in a year, and zero otherwise 
GOVt = A corporate governance index based on a factor analysis of the 
characteristics of boards and executive officers and ownership structure. 
Board and management attributes include CEO duality, board size, the 
percentage of independent directors in a board, the percentage of 
independent directors over age 69, and the percentage of busy independent 
directors (Core et al. 1998). Ownership structure includes CEO ownership 
as a percentage of number of shares outstanding, the existence of non-CEO 
insiders with ownership over 5%, the number of outside block-holders with 
ownership over 5%, and institutional investors’ ownership as a percentage 
of number of shares outstanding (Core et al. 1998; Bushee 1998; Hartzell 
and Stark 2003). Standardized scoring coefficients are as follows: 
0.173*CEO duality + 0.427*Percentage of independent directors + 0.195 
*Board size – 0.002*Percentage of old independent directors + 
0.297*Percentage of busy independent directors – 0.273*CEO ownership – 
0.002*The number of block holders with 5% ownership + 
0.125*Institutional ownership – 0.401*An indicator for non-CEO insiders 
with 5% ownership.  
CH_AUB4t = An indicator for an auditor change from a non-Big 4 or from a Big 4 audit 
firm to a Big 4 audit firm (Deloitte, PWC, EY, KPMG) 
CH_AUNB4t = An indicator for an auditor change from a non-Big 4 firm or from a Big 4 
audit firm to a non-Big 4 audit firm  
AUDCOMPt = An indicator for high overlapping membership, which equals one if the 
percentage of compensation committee members who are audit committee 
members exceeds its sample median and zero otherwise 
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TABLE 1 
Sample selection and sample distribution 
Panel A: Sample selection procedures 
Description N 
All the firm-years of ExecuComp CEO data and IRRC/Riskmetrics data merged 
with the data derived from the annual COMPUSTAT/CRSP merged file for the 
period 1995–2012 
32,669 
Less: Firm-years lacking  
Current and lagged values in the log of one plus total compensation, the log of one 
plus cash compensation, and the logarithm of one plus the cash incentive 
(2,391) 
Current and lagged values in annual stock returns, earnings before NSIs, and the 
natural logarithm of sales 
(1,689) 
Current and lagged values in the standard deviation of annual stock returns, earnings 
before negative special items, and investment opportunities 
(10,793) 
Current and lagged values in correctly classified and misclassified NSIs (1,001) 
Final sample (1995–2012) 16,795 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution by the Fama and French (1997) 48 industries 
Industry N % Industry N % 
Business service 1,644 9.8 Computers 502 3.0 
Utilities 1,247 7.4 Measuring & control equipment 489 2.9 
Retail 1,211 7.2 Chemicals 465 2.8 
Electronic equipment 1,164 6.9 Laboratory equipment 424 2.5 
Pharmaceutical products 765 4.6 Telecommunication 393 2.3 
Petroleum and natural gas 737 4.4 Restaurants, hotel, motel 384 2.3 
Machine & equipment 696 4.1 Finance 383 2.3 
Insurance 603 3.6 Food 382 2.3 
Transportation 532 3.2 Paper  381 2.3 
Wholesale 526 3.1 Other industries 3,867 23.0 
 
Panel C: Sample distribution by fiscal year (N = 16,795) 
Year N % Year N % Year N % 
1995 631 3.8 2001 873 5.2 2007 1,021 6.1 
1996 698 4.2 2002 922 5.5 2008 1,025 6.1 
1997 718 4.3 2003 974 5.8 2009 1,085 6.5 
1998 773 4.6 2004 996 6.0 2010 1,104 6.6 
1999 846 5.0 2005 1,004 6.0 2011 1,116 6.6 
2000 868 5.2 2006 1,014 6.0 2012 1,127 6.7 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics     
Panel A: Summary statistics over total sample period  
Variable N Mean SD 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
Compensation          
CEOINCPAYt  
(mil$) 
16,795 3.279 9.312 0.000 0.526 1.514 3.685 11.10 
INCPAYt   
(log of 1+mil$) 
16,795 1.048 0.790 0.000 0.423 0.922 1.544 2.493 
EBNSIt 16,795 0.063 0.128 -0.084 0.030 0.065 0.112 0.231 
STDEBNSIt 16,795 0.119 0.297 0.008 0.020 0.040 0.092 0.413 
RETt 16,795 0.140 0.489 -0.537 -0.148 0.087 0.336 1.009 
RETtDNEG, t 16,795 -0.106 0.187 -0.537 -0.148 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STDRETt 16,795 0.966 0.855 0.255 0.463 0.716 1.125 2.629 
LOGASSETSt 16,795 7.230 1.617 4.787 6.056 7.077 8.260 10.149 
INVOPPt 16,795 2.017 1.370 0.971 1.191 1.571 2.309 4.699 
Special items         
NSIt 16,795 0.021 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.103 
UE_CEt  (McVay) 16,795 0.020 0.131 -0.099 -0.019 0.008 0.047 0.186 
CSt  (McVay) 16,795 0.021 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.129 
NSINCS,t  (McVay) 16,795 -0.001 0.058 -0.086 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.066 
UE_CEt (Fan et al.) 16,795 0.016 0.141 -0.102 -0.019 0.006 0.043 0.177 
CSt  (Fan et al.)  16,795 0.019 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.117 
NSINCS,t (Fan et al.)  16,795 0.001 0.064 -0.084 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.074 
Governance         
INDBD,t 11,667 2.125 1.052 0.000 1.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 
GOVt 9,878 0.044 0.965 -1.887 -0.415 0.192 0.691 1.356 
AUDCOMPt 11,671 0.615 0.487 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CH_AUB4t 16,795 0.040 0.195 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CH_AUNB4t 16,795 0.007 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: See Appendix 2 for definitions of variables in this table. 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Panel B: Summary statistics by pre- and post-SOX periods 
Variables 
(a)  
Pre-SOX  
(95–02) 
Post-Sox (03–12) Mean differences 
(b) 
Pre-crisis 
(03–07) 
(c) 
Post-crisis  
(08–12) 
(b – a) (c – b) 
INCPAYt  
(log 1+mil.) 
0.948 1.093 1.123 0.145*** 0.030*** 
EBNSIt 0.056 0.069 0.067 0.014*** -0.002 
STDEBNSIt 0.107 0.128 0.124 0.021*** -0.004 
RETt 0.131 0.191 0.103 0.061*** -0.089*** 
DNEG, t 0.427 0.330 0.421 -0.097*** 0.091*** 
STDRETt 0.929 1.103 0.884 0.174*** -0.219*** 
LOGASSETSt 7.080 7.220 7.415 0.140*** 0.195*** 
INVOPPt 2.076 2.081 1.890 0.006 -0.191*** 
NSIt  0.021 0.017 0.023 -0.004*** 0.006*** 
CSt (McVay) 0.022 0.021 0.022 -0.001 0.001 
CSt (Fan et al.) 0.018 0.018 0.022 0.000 0.003*** 
INDBD, t 1.285 2.204 2.632 0.918*** 0.428*** 
GOVt -0.196 0.142 0.224 0.338*** 0.082*** 
Note: The pre-SOX period is 1998–2002 for board and committee independence. ***, **, * 
represents significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel C: Summary statistics by the non-compliance status prior to the passage of SOX 
Variable 
(a) 
Compliant firms  
(N = 1856) 
(b) 
Non-compliant firms  
(N = 446) 
Mean 
Differences 
(b – a)  
UE_CEt (McVay)  0.024  0.025 0.001 
UE_CEt (Fan et al.)  0.019  0.021 0.002 
NSIt  0.020  0.015 -0.005* 
INCPAYt  (log 1+mil.)  1.204  1.006 -0.199*** 
EBNSIt  0.076  0.066 -0.010** 
STDEBNSIt  0.085  0.082 -0.003 
RETt  0.195  0.223 0.028 
DNEG, t  -0.071  -0.073 -0.002 
STDRETt  0.936  0.999 0.063 
INVOPPt  2.069  2.074 0.005 
LOGASSETSt  7.572  7.304 -0.269*** 
CSt (McVay)  0.025  0.020 -0.005* 
NSINCS,t  (McVay)  -0.005  -0.004 0.001 
CSt (Fan et al.)  0.021  0.019 -0.002 
NSINCS,t (Fan et. al.)  -0.001  -0.004 -0.003 
Note:  The period is 2000– 2006 (all observations for 2002 is omitted). ***, **, * represents 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 3     
Classification shifting and compensation shielding – Base case 
Table 3 presents classification shifting and compensation shielding. Panel A presents the 
regression of unexpected core earnings (UE_CE) on negative special items (NSI). See Panel B 
presents the regression of CEO total incentive pay on NSI and its components in 1995–2012. 
INCPAYt is the log of one plus CEO total incentive pay. NSIt is negative special items deflated by 
sales. CSt is the classification-shifted component of NSI. NSINCS,t is the non-classification-shifted 
component of NSI. EBNSIt is income before extraordinary items and NSIs deflated by sales for 
year t; StdEBNSIt is the standard deviation of EBNSI for the past five years (years t−5 to t−1); 
RETt is annual stock returns including a dividend payment; STDRETt is the standard deviation of 
RET for the past five years (years t−5 to t−1); DNEG,t ×RETt is negative stock returns; INVOPPt is 
investment opportunities; and LOGASSETSt is the logarithm of total assets at the start of year t. 
Year- and firm-fixed effects are controlled, and the coefficient on an intercept is not reported for 
brevity. ***, **, * indicate significance of each coefficient at the level of 1%, 5%, 10%, 
respectively.  
Panel A. Regression of unexpected core earnings on negative special items 
 
Dependent variable = UE_CE   
(a) McVay (b) Fan et al.     
NSIt 0.258*** -0.077***     
 (12.88) (-3.52)     
Fixed effects (Year, Firm) Yes Yes     
N 16,795 16,795     
R-squared  0.220 0.196     
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Panel B: Results of regressing CEO total incentive on the components of negative special items  
 Dependent variable = INCPAY 
 
(a)   (b)  
CS from 
McVay 
(c)  
CS from Fan 
et al. 
  
NSIt -0.311***      
 (-3.86)      
NSINCS, t   -0.208** -0.273***   
   (-2.39) (-3.29)   
CSt   -0.452*** -0.415***   
   (-4.62) (-3.76)   
Control variables       
EBNSIt 0.626***  0.631*** 0.633***   
 (13.26)  (13.37) (13.38)   
STDEBNSIt -0.092***  -0.093*** -0.091***   
 (-3.27)  (-3.30) (-3.24)   
RETt 0.102***  0.102*** 0.102***   
 (8.52)  (8.46) (8.45)   
DNEG,t×RETt 0.040  0.044 0.040   
 (1.15)  (1.25) (1.15)   
STDRETt 0.026***  0.027
*** 0.026***   
 (3.74)  (3.77) (3.75)   
INVOPPt 0.035***  0.035
*** 0.034***   
 (5.16)  (5.21) (5.15)   
LOGASSETSt 0.145***  0.146
*** 0.145***   
 (12.63)  (12.74) (12.66)   
Fixed effects (Year, Firm) Yes  Yes Yes   
N 16,795  16,795 16,795   
R-squared 0.676  0.676 0.676   
 
Tests for coefficient equality 
 
 
 
 
 
CSt  – NSINCS, t   -0.244*** -0.142   
   (-2.67) (-1.58)   
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TABLE 4 
Effects of a regulatory change in board and committee independence on classification shifting and compensation shielding 
Table 4 shows effects of a regulatory change in board and committee independence on classification shifting and compensation shielding. 
NCOMPLYt is an indicator for non-compliant firms for board or committees at the first shareholders' meeting occurring after the end of 1999 
and the non-compliance status does not change prior to the passage of SOX (June 2002). NCOMPLYt equals one if less than 100% of 
committee members (50% of board members) are independent and zero otherwise. POSTt is an indicator variable for the post-SOX period and 
equals one for the 2003–2006 period and zero for the 2000–2001. Since we control for firm-fixed effects, we do not report the coefficients on 
an intercept and NCOMPLY for brevity.  ***. **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Effects of a regulatory change in board and committee independence on classification shifting (Testing H1) 
  Dependent variable = UE_CE 
  Regulatory change in the independence of  
 Sign Comp. committee Audit committee Board of directors 
 (Hypothesis) (a) McVay (b) Fan et al.  (c) McVay (d) Fan et al.  (e) McVay (f) Fan et al.  
NSIt ? 0.381*** 0.147 0.419*** 0.126 0.511*** 0.173* 
  (4.77) (1.40) (3.88) (1.66) (5.35) (2.73) 
NSIt × NCOMPLYt ? 0.181 -0.123 -0.268* -0.297 -0.196 -0.417* 
  (1.12) (-0.41) (-2.55) (-0.76) (-0.63) (-2.20) 
NSIt × POSTt                        - -0.046 -0.340*** -0.030 -0.296* -0.193 -0.264*** 
 (H1) (-0.30) (-4.54) (-0.20) (-2.35) (-1.24) (-4.42) 
NSIt × NCOMPLYt × POSTt   - -0.233 0.078 0.116 0.311 0.049 0.095 
 (H1) (-0.90) (0.23) (0.32) (0.47) (0.23) (0.51) 
POSTt  ? 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 0.009 0.003 
  (0.04) (-0.80) (-0.29) (-1.87) (1.02) (0.82) 
NCOMPLYt   POSTt ? -0.005 0.001 -0.008 -0.004 -0.015 -0.009 
  (-0.43) (0.07) (-1.66) (-0.64) (-1.14) (-0.85) 
Fixed effects (Firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-clustering effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  2,302 2,302 2,218 2,218 3,208 3,208 
R-squared  0.405 0.308 0.485 0.363 0.381 0.298 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Panel B. Effects of a regulatory change in board and committee independence on compensation shielding (Testing H2) 
  Dependent variable = INCPAY 
  Regulatory change in the independence of  
 Sign Comp. committee Audit committee Board of directors 
 (Hypothesis) (a) McVay (b) Fan et al.  (c) McVay (d) Fan et al.  (e) McVay (f) Fan et al.  
NSINCS, t ? 0.004 -0.053 0.635 0.359 0.068 0.043 
  (0.01) (-0.14) (1.54) (0.85) (0.13) (0.13) 
CSt ? 0.677 1.062* 1.341*** 1.533** 0.863** 1.165 
  (1.78) (1.99) (4.94) (2.70) (2.62) (1.68) 
NSINCS, t NCOMPLYt  ? 0.962 1.666* -0.039 0.446 0.396 0.364 
  (1.07) (2.10) (-0.06) (0.94) (0.62) (1.05) 
CSt NCOMPLYt  ? 2.347** 1.662** 0.009 0.044 -0.239 -0.329 
  (3.84) (2.60) (0.01) (0.06) (-0.33) (-0.31) 
NSINCS, t POSTt  ? -0.085 -0.469 -0.628 -0.847 -0.541 -1.814 
  (-0.11) (-0.68) (-0.94) (-1.43) (-0.70) (-1.37) 
CSt POSTt                          - -2.118* -2.999** -2.536** -3.080*** -2.420** -2.970*** 
 (H2) (-2.18) (-3.64) (-3.06) (-4.10) (-3.22) (-3.82) 
NSINCS,tPOSTtNCOMPLYt ? -2.718* -2.942** -1.457 -1.281 -0.181 -0.251 
  (-2.21) (-2.67) (-1.36) (-1.54) (-0.15) (-0.22) 
CStPOSTt  NCOMPLYt       - -2.741* -1.742* -1.375 -1.327* 0.689 0.759 
 (H2) (-2.50) (-2.00) (-1.55) (-2.00) (0.55) (0.52) 
POSTt  ? 0.061** 0.075** 0.089** 0.096** -0.083* 0.105** 
  (2.89) (3.26) (3.01) (3.34) (-2.19) (3.22) 
POSTt NCOMPLYt ? 0.131* 0.114* 0.050 0.049 -0.018 -0.022 
  (2.30) (2.20) (1.53) (1.73) (-0.37) (-0.42) 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
 
 Regulatory change in the independence of  
 Comp. committee Audit committee Board of directors 
 (a) McVay (b) Fan et al.  (c) McVay (d) Fan et al.  (e) McVay (f) Fan et al.  
Control variables       
EBNSIt 1.263*** 1.226*** 1.578*** 1.533*** 1.057*** 1.118*** 
 (6.71) (6.67) (8.87) (7.84) (6.71) (7.09) 
STDEBNSIt -0.405*** -0.443*** -0.319*** -0.343*** -0.351*** -0.343** 
 (-5.50) (-6.91) (-5.17) (-6.38) (-11.55) (-21.25) 
RETt 0.107* 0.110* 0.090 0.093 0.129*** 0.102** 
 (2.38) (2.33) (1.62) (1.62) (4.20) (2.53) 
DNEG,tRETt -0.113 -0.125 -0.130 -0.137 -0.173 -0.125 
 (-0.62) (-0.69) (-0.61) (-0.65) (-1.13) (-0.88) 
STDRETt 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.012 0.045* 0.029 
 (0.90) (0.86) (0.73) (0.55) (2.51) (1.73) 
INVOPPt 0.030 0.033 0.010 0.014 0.038 0.027 
 (0.95) (1.07) (0.21) (0.29) (1.22) (0.77) 
LOGASSETSt 0.056** 0.046* 0.052* 0.047* 0.014 0.047 
 (2.82) (2.18) (2.36) (2.38) (0.34) (1.73) 
Fixed effects (Firm) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,302 2,302 2,218 2,218 3,208 3,208 
R-squared 0.708 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.706 0.704 
 
 
45 
 
TABLE 5  
Effects of overall governance on classification shifting and compensation shielding 
 
This table shows effects of overall governance on classification shifting and compensation 
shielding. The strength of overall governance is proxied by a corporate governance index. The 
index is formed by a factor analysis using variables pertaining to management characteristics, and 
board and ownership structure. All other variables are as defined in Table 4.  An intercept and the 
coefficients on control variables are not reported for brevity. ***. **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  
Panel A. Association between a corporate governance index and classification shifting (H1) 
 
 Sign Dependent variable = UE_CE 
 (Hypothesis) (a) McVay (b) Fan et al.    
NSIt ? 0.341*** 0.012   
  (15.69) (0.52)   
GOVt ? -0.001 -0.000   
  (-0.60) (-0.02)   
NSIt × GOVt                                      - -0.088*** -0.083***   
 (H1) (-3.70) (-3.30)   
Fixed effects (Firm, Year)  Yes Yes   
N  13,375 13,375   
R-squared  0.270 0.238   
 
 
Panel B. Association between a corporate governance index and compensation shielding (H2) 
 
 Sign Dependent variable = INCPAY  
(Hypothesis) (a) McVay (b) Fan et al.    
NSINCS, t ? -0.249** -0.271***   
  (-2.35) (-2.65)   
CSt ? -0.281** -0.272**   
  (-2.41) (-2.05)   
GOVt ? 0.074*** 0.071***   
  (8.01) (7.71)   
NSINCS, t × GOVt   ? -0.103 -0.163   
  (-0.90) (-1.49)   
CSt × GOVt                                    - -0.370*** -0.262**   
 (H2) (-3.09) (-1.96)   
Control variables     
EBNSIt  0.734*** 0.735***   
  (11.63) (11.61)   
The other control variables  Yes Yes   
Fixed effects (Firm, Year)  Yes Yes   
N  13,375 13,375   
R-squared  0.686 0.686   
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TABLE 6 
Effects changes in audit quality on classification shifting and compensation shielding 
 
This table shows the effects of changes in audit quality on classification shifting and compensation 
shielding. CH_AUB4t is an indicator variable for an auditor change in year t from a non-Big 4 
firm or from a Big-4 firm to a Big 4 firm. CH_AUNB4t is an indicator variable for an auditor 
change in year t from a Big 4 or from a non-Big-4 firm to a non-Big 4 firm. The coefficients on 
control variables are not reported for brevity. An intercept is not reported with firm-fixed effects 
controlled. ***. **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
In all panels of Table 6, Columns (a) and (b) use 16,795 observations.  
 
Panel A. Effects of changes in audit quality on classification shifting (H1)    
 Sign Dependent variable = UE_CE 
 (Hypothesis) (a) McVay (b) Fan et al.   
NSIt ? 0.282*** -0.056**   
  (13.64) (-2.46)   
NSIt   CH_AUNB4t + 0.514* 0.814***   
 (H1) (1.84) (2.66)   
NSIt   CH_AUB4t - -0.374*** -0.354***   
 (H1) (-4.99) (-4.33)   
CH_AUNB4t ? 0.005 0.004   
  (0.36) (0.26)   
CH_AUB4t ? -0.010* -0.010   
  (-1.72) (-1.49)   
Fixed effects (Firm, Year)  Yes Yes   
N  16,795 16,795   
R-squared  0.222 0.198   
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Effects of changes in audit quality on compensation shielding (H2) 
 Sign Dependent variable = INCPAY 
 (Hypothesis) (a) McVay (b) Fan et al.   
NSINCS, t  ? -0.183
** -0.255***   
  (-2.05) (-2.99)   
CSt ? -0.413*** -0.380***   
  (-4.13) (-3.34)   
NSINCS, t  CH_AUNB4t ? 0.643 0.544   
  (0.60) (0.51)   
CSt  CH_AUNB4t + 0.392 0.711   
 (H2) (0.39) (0.63)   
NSINCS, t  CH_AUB4t ? -0.483 -0.325   
  (-1.42) (-1.03)   
CSt  CH_AUB4t - -0.890** -0.721*   
 (H2) (-2.11) (-1.65)   
CH_AUNB4t  ? -0.037 -0.045   
  (-0.70) (-0.84)   
CH_AUB4t ? 0.008 0.005   
  (0.35) (0.21)   
Control variables      
EBNSIt  0.631*** 0.631***   
  (13.35) (13.33)   
The other control variables   Yes Yes   
Fixed effects (Firm, Year)  Yes        Yes   
N  16,795 16,795   
R-squared  0.676 0.676   
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TABLE 7 
Effects of overlapping membership on classification shifting and compensation shielding 
This table shows effects of overlapping membership on compensation shielding. AUDCOMPt is 
an indicator variable for overlapping membership on the compensation and audit committees and 
equals one if the percentage of compensation committee members who are audit committee 
members exceed the sample median and zero otherwise. INDAUD, t is an indicator variable for an 
independent audit committee. An intercept and the coefficients on control variables are not 
reported for brevity. ***. **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Effect overlapping membership on classification shifting (Testing H1) 
 Sign Dependent variable = UE_CE 
  (a) McVay (b) Fan et al.   
NSIt ? 0.075 -0.131
*   
  (1.08) (-1.78)   
NSIt × AUDCOMPt +/- 0.272*** 0.085   
  (3.15) (0.93)   
NSIt × INDAUD,t  – 0.231*** 0.088   
 (H1) (2.94) (1.06)   
NSIt× INDAUD, t ×AUDCOMPt +/– -0.221
** -0.026   
  (-2.24) (-0.24)   
AUDCOMPt ? 0.005 0.000   
  (0.82) (-0.08)   
INDAUD,t  ? 0.006 0.003   
  (1.14) (0.48)   
INDAUD, t × AUDCOMPt ? -0.006 -0.001   
  (-1.01) (-0.1)   
      
      
Fixed effects (Firm, Year)  Yes Yes   
N  11,734 11,734   
R-square  0.275 0.248   
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Table 7 (Continued) 
Panel B. Effect of overlapping membership on compensation shielding (Testing H2)  
 Sign Dependent variable = INCPAY 
  (a) McVay (b) Fan et al.   
NSINCS, t ? -0.081 -0.132   
  (-0.24) (-0.40)   
CSt  ? -0.474 -0.075   
  (-1.2) (-0.18)   
NSINCS, t × AUDCOMPt ? 0.379 0.761*   
  (0.89) (1.88)   
CSt × AUDCOMPt +/- 1.546*** 1.256**   
  (3.33) (2.48)   
NSINCS, t × INDAUD, t  ? -0.367 -0.506   
  (-0.95) (-1.37)   
CSt × INDAUD, t - -0.541 -0.831*   
 (H2) (-1.25) (-1.78)   
NSINCS, t × INDAUD, t ×AUDCOMPt ? -0.323 -0.579   
  (-0.66) (-1.24)   
CSt × INDAUD, t × AUDCOMPt +/- -1.073** -0.980*   
  (-2.03) (-1.69)   
AUDCOMPt ? -0.029 -0.021   
  (-1.15) (-0.83)   
INDAUD, t  ? 0.050** 0.053**   
  (2.14) (2.29)   
INDAUD, t × AUDCOMPt ? -0.014 -0.016   
  (-0.5) (-0.59)   
Control variables      
EBNSIt  0.703*** 0.708***   
  (10.49) (10.55)   
The other control variables  Yes Yes   
Fixed effects (Firm, Year)  Yes Yes   
N  11,734 11,734   
R-square  0.692 0.692   
 
 
